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THE AVAILABILITY OF A MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE AS A PROTECTION AGAINST
HOSTILE PUBLICITY
The increasing impact of mass communications media-resulting
from the growth of modern television, coupled with wider newspaper
circulation and the extended use of automobile radios-has added to
the difficulty of a defendant in a criminal case obtaining a fair trial.,
There has, in fact, been severe criticism of these communications
media for their attempts to incline public opinion toward an accused's
guilt or innocence prior to trial.2 In many cases when reporting the
arrest of a suspect the press gives immediate publicity to statements
of the police, the suspect or accused, and persons claiming to be wit-
nesses.- Alleged confessions appearing in the newspapers are often
accepted by the community as final evidence of guilt.4 The radio news
commentator broadcasts his interpretation of rumored evidence and
progress of the investigation.. That the courts permit any of the
above evils to exist may be attributed to the constitutional right of
freedom of the press,6 and the feeling that a moderate amount of
publicity will have a salutary effect on the administration of criminal
justice, by insuring preservation of the rights of the accused and the
public. 7
1. Goodhart, Newspaper and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 Harv. L.
Rev. 885 (1935); Note, Controlling Press and Radio Influence on Trials, 63 Harv.
L Rev. 840 (1950); Comment, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 532 (1953).
2. Ibid. See also Walton, Change Of Venue In Criminal Cases, 1 So. Texas
LJ. 131 (1954). But see Harvey, Trial By Newspaper, 42 Mass. L.Q. 9 (1957)
indicating the dangers of censoring the press.
3. See Hallam, Some Object Lessons On Publicity In Criminal Trials, 24 Minn.
L. Rev. 453 (1940); Note, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951). See also note 3 supra.
5. Walton, supra note 2.
The recent Kefauver crime investigation which held the attention of television
viewers for many weeks is an example of the dilemma that improved methods
of communication pose to the administration of justice. In News Week, March
12, 1951, p. 54, col. 3, it was stated that "the hottest new program in television
is an amateur road show: the touring Senate committee investigating organized
crime ... The Kefauver company opened its T.V. run late in January in New
Orleans .... And when the committee left town, school children had the new
habit of refusing to answer teachers' questions 'on the grounds that I might in-
criminate myself.' "
6. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). The Constitution protects the
free dissemination of news. U.S. Const. amend. I. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925) is cited for the proposition that the first amendment is included within
the fourteenth.
7. See Hallam, supra note 3; Sullivan, Public's Legal Right to the News, 16
Shingle 248 (1953).
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The criminal lawyer, although individually incapable of success-
fully preventing publicity hostile to his client-accused, s must seek
some means to insure that his client will receive a fair trial The
procedural devices most often relied upon are the motion for change
of venue and motion for continuance.9 The former is available to
the defendant in a criminal case when local prejudice and excitement
prevents him from having a fair trial,20 but may involve considerable
expense and inconvenience in the preparation of his defense;1 more-
over, if the trial moves to a different locality, there is a good chance
that radio and television stations, and nation-wide newspaper services
will follow it.12 Thus, a change of venue in many instances will prove
to be unsatisfactory. It appears that a motion for continuance, to de-
lay the trial until the effects of hostile publicity have diminished, will
afford the defendant greater protection. The purpose of this note is to
discuss and analyze the motion for continuance of a criminal trial by
8. In the past courts have protected their proceedings from the effects of hostile
publicity by a free use of their summary contempt power. Nelles, Contempt By
Publication In The United States (1928). In English courts the problem is still
handled this way. Goodhart, supra note 1. However, recent United State Supreme
Court decisions indicate that courts have little power to punish newspapers or
other like media for dissemination of publicity concerning criminal trials. See
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (the "inherent tendency" of
out-of-court publicity to interfere with the right of an accused to a fair trial, or
to cause disrespect for the judiciary, is not sufficient to establish actionable con-
tempt). But see Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950)
-where the Court was careful to note that it was not taking any stand on the
propriety of the court of appeals' refusal to allow a contempt charge. Is it pos-
sible that the Court is changing its attitude toward this problem? See also
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 1952) where the court
stated that "on this view there has been some fatalistic acceptance of 'trial by
newspaper,' however unfortunate, 'as an unavoidable curse of metropolitan liv-
ing...." The court further reasoned that "perhaps the Supreme Court has not
spoken its last word upon this vexing subject."
9. See Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952); United States
v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Note, supra note 1.
10. Walton, supra note 2; Note, Local Prejudice In Criminal Trials, 54 Harv.
L. Rev. 679 (1941); Comment, 22 St. John's L. Rev. 261 (1947). For a compre-
hensive discussion of change of venue see Crocher v. Justices, 208 Mass. 163, 94
N.E. 369 (1911) where it was stated that the power to grant a change of venue
is part of the common law and is inherent in the court, unless specifically changed
by statutes. See also State v. Albee, 61 N.H.. 423 (1881).
11. See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp, 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939) where it was
reasoned that venue statutes are for the convenience of the parties.
12. See United States v. Lattimore, 112 F. Supp. 507, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1953)
(stating that there was no indication one district would be less prejudiced than
another); United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y 1952).
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considering the various factors which move courts to grant or deny
this relief to an accused who has received adverse publicity.
CONTINUANCES
In General
It is well established that all courts have the "inherent" power to
continue a pending action.' The grant or denial of a motion for con-
tinuance is within the discretion of the trial court.5 Since appellate
courts generally presume that the trial judge, as a resident of the
area, has a better understanding of the true situation,21 the decision
of the trial judge will not be reversed unless the party complaining
of the ruling,7 is able to carry the burden of showing strongly that
this discretion was abused.",
13. It should be noted that many courts consider the same factors in granting
or denying a motion for change of venue as for a motion for continuance. State
v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E2d 471, afrd., 165 Ohio 293, 135 N.E.2d
340 (1955). See also Collins v. State, 234 Ala. 197, 174 So. 296 (1937); Littlefield
v. State, 36 Ala. App. 507, 63 So. 2d. 565, cert. denied, 258 Ala. 532, 63 So. 2d 573
(1952). For this reason, change of venue cases will subsequently be cited in sup-
port of certain propositions where the reasoning would apply to either.
14. Dietrich v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp, 9 F.2d
733, 746 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 647 (1925); State v. Slorah, 118 Me.
203, 106 AtL 768 (1919) (other actions were not impliedly excluded where a
statute reaffirmed this power in regard to specific actions).
In order to be certain that there is no misunderstanding of the type of con-
tinuance here considered, the following classification should be helpful Continu-
ances may be classified into two groups: (1) those which operate as a matter of
law; (2) those which operate by virtue of a court order. The first group includes
all cases which remain at the end of a court term. The undisputed rule is that
they are continued automatically without the issuance of any court order. The
second group may be further divided into sub-classes: (1) where a continuance
is granted by the court on its own motion; (2) where a continuance is granted
at the request of both parties; (3) where one or more interested parties ask,
for cause, that the court grant a continuance. The third sub-class under group
two is the type of continuance that will be the concern of this writing-where one
or more interested parties asks, for cause, that the court grant a continuance-the
cause being prejudice created by hostile publicity. The above classification may
be found in greater detail at 12 Am. Jur., Continuances § 2 (1938). See also
17 C.J.S. §§ 1, 9-12 (1939).
15. United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952); Shushan v. United
States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941); Pittman v. State, 51 Fla. 94, 41 So. 385
(1906) ; Carsons v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 1, 47 S.W.2d 997 (1931) (citing a long
line of authority).
16. Carsons v. Commonwealth, supra note 15.
17. Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941).
18. Hysler v. State, 132 Fla. 209, 181 So. 354 (1938); Moore v. State, 59 Fla.
23, 52 So. 971 (1910).
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General Availability for Protection Against Inflamiatory Publicity
A frequent ground alleged for a continuance is that adverse pub-
licity concerning the accused has been so widely distributed that an
unbiased jury cannot be obtained.21 The great weight of authority
takes the position that inflammatory publicity as ground for a con-
tinuance is a discretionary matter for the trial court,20 the facts of
each case being carefully considered in determining whether or not
the accused can receive a fair triaL=
A few courts, however, have categorically stated that such publicity
is not an adequate ground for a continuance, even though its natural
tendency is to excite public prejudice and arouse passions.2z Many
of these courts have grounded this conclusion on the rationale that
it is the duty of the state to provide a prompt trial for the protection
of society and that a change of venue is usually available to protect
the accused from hostility.23 Other reasons sometimes given for the
refusal to grant a continuance to protect the accused against adverse
publicity are that the courts in this country are continually under
attack because they are behind on their criminal dockets, that extra
expense is involved, and that there is a possibility of death or loss of
memory of a vital witness.24 A refusal to grant a continuance which
is based on any of these rationale, however, would apparently be in-
consistent with the constitutional principle entitling an accused to a
fair trial
Factors Which. Appellate Courts Have Considered Important in
Reviewing Trial Court's Failure to Grant a Continuance
At this point an investigation will be made of the various factors
that courts consider when deciding whether to grant a continuance
on the ground of hostile publicity. Since trial court opinions ruling
on motions for continuance are rare, these factors must be found in
the opinions of appellate courts reviewing the trial judge's refusal to
19. E.g., Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952); United States
v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952). See also Harvey, Trial By Newspaper,
42 Mass. L.Q. 9 (1957).
20. E.g., Paschen v. United States, 70 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1934); State v.
Golden, 353 Mo. 585, 183 S.W.2d 109 (1944).
21. State v. Golden, supra note 20.
22. E.g., Finnegan v. United States, 204 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1953); Littlefield
v. State, 36 Ala. App. 507, 63 So.. 2d 565, cert. denied, 258 Ala. 532, 63 So. 2d 575
(1952) ; State v. Rice, 7 Idaho 762, 6 Pac. 87 (1901) ; Hatfield v. Commonwealth,
287 Ky. 467, 153 S.W.2d 892 (1941) ; State v. Seyboldt, 65 Utah 204, 236 Pac. 225
(1925).
23. E.g., State v. Seyboldt, supra note 22 at 217, 236 Pac. at 231.
24. See Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1314, 1317 n.6 (1955). Cf. Vanderbilt, Impasses
In Justice, 1956 Wash. U.L.Q. 287-300.
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allow the motion. However, trial courts undoubtedly grant many con-
tinuances on the ground of hostile publicity. 5
1. Source
The source of information may determine whether a postponement
will be granted. If the information which created the hostile publicity
was given to the press by the prosecuting attorney, there is a good
chance a court will find a continuance should have been ordered.2
Similarly, publicity from a legislative source may weigh heavily in
favor of a continuance. In Delaney v. United States,2- defendant,
Collector of Internal Revenue, was indicted for accepting bribes. In
the interval between the indictment and the trial, congressional sub-
committee hearings were held in the vicinity of the trial. Witnesses
who were to appear later at the trial were examined but not cross-
examined, and the salient aspects of their testimony were published
by the newspapers in colorful feature stories.28 The trial court re-
fused to grant a continuance, and on appeal it was held that if the
United States chooses to hold legislative hearings which result in
prejudice to a person awaiting trial, the trial must be postponed; the
alternative would be to delay the hearings until the trial is completed.
It should be noted that the Department of Justice and legislature in
the Delaney case were both federal agencies. But the Delaney doc-
trine has been extended to include a situation which involved a federal
prosecution and a state crime commission hearing.-  .
United States -v. Hoffa,30 on the other hand, apparently limited the
25. Documentation of these propositions is difficult. No case has been found
in which an appellate court reviewed an order granting a motion for continuance.
In addition, experienced trial judges have indicated in interviews that motions
for continuance are often granted because of hostile publicity.
26. In Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 1952) the court
stated: "If all this material had been fed to the press by the prosecuting officials
of the Department of Justice, we think that an appellate court would have had
to say that the denial of a longer continuance was an abuse of discretion." See
also Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, Hunter v.
United States, 267 U.S. 597 (1925) where a continuance was not allowed because
the court believed the jury was not prejudiced, but the prosecuting attorney was
severely criticized for certain press releases. Contra, United States v. Leviton,
193 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1951).
27. 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952).
28. The publicity was carripl by Life magazine with a 5,000,000 circulation.
This was supplemented by radio and television broadcasts. Id. at 11L
29. United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (a venue case which
indicated that the same principle would apply to a continuance).
30. 156 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Also compare Delaney with United
States v. Moran, 194 F,2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp.
761 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa.
1953); Green v. Maine, 113 F. Supp. 253 (S.D. Me. 1953); United States v.
Carper, 13 F.R.D. 483 (D.C.D.C. 1953) (venue case).
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doctrine of the Delaney case to its facts. The Hoffa case was similar
to the Delaney case in that publicity was widespread and referred
extensively to congressional hearing testimony concerning defendant.
However, the court distinguished the nature of the publicity en-
gendered by the hearings in the two cases when it stated that in Hoffa
the committee made a conscious effort to avoid questions directly re-
lated to the pending indictment; that defendant was represented by
counsel who was permitted to and did interpose objections; and that
the committee promptly withdrew questions on objection of counsel
that they concerned a pending indictment32 It is submitted, that if
the Hoffa court accepted the Delaney doctrine, there was no adequate
reason for distinguishing the type of testimony at the hearing. The
basic consideration should have been whether publicity engendered
by the hearing was sufficiently prejudicial to the defendant; if it was,
defendant's trial should have been postponed.
Of course, if the accused is the source of publicity, there will be
little ground for a continuance.
32
2. Nature, Scope, and Style of Publicity
The exact nature, scope, and style of the publicity are often used
as balancing factors by the courts. If publicity is disseminated on a
nation-wide basis, courts will be more inclined to grant a continuance
than a change of venue because a change of venue would provide little
protection.33 In one case where the evidence showed that inflammatory
publicity was purely local, the court would not reverse the trial court's
refusal to allow a continuance.3 4 A like result was reached where the
motion was based on a vituperative letter to the editor which appeared
in a local newspaper and urged the death sentence for the defendant. 5
Even though publicity is widespread, the largest percentage must be
hostile to the accused, because the reviewing court will be hesitant to
disturb the trial judge's ruling when the publicity is partly favorable
and partly hostile.36
31. United States v. Hoffa, supra note 30 at 502.
32. Cf. Honda v. People, 111 Colo. 279, 141 P.2d 178 (1943).
33. See text supported by note 12 supra; Green v. Maine, 113 F. Supp. 253, 255
(S.D. Me. 1953) the court reasoning: "[AJnd finally... it does not appear
that the publicity ... was so widespread as in Delaney." Cf. United States v.
Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; Collins v. State, 234 Ala. 197, 174 So. 296
(1937); Sundahl v. State, 154 Neb. 550, 48 N.W.2d 689 (1951).
34. Collins v. State, supra note 33.
35. Sundahl v. State, 154 Neb. 550, 48 N.V.2d 689 (1951).
36. United States v. Lattimore, 112 F. Supp. 507, 511 (D.C.D.C. 1953). Com-
pare with cases in note 99 infra, which show that appellate courts will be hesitant
to upset a trial court's decision when affidavits are controverted. See also Murphy
and Newcomb, Experimental Social Psychology 962-63 (2d ed. 1937) stating:
"The effectiveness of 'propaganda' is thus seen to depend upon how clear a field
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss4/5
NOTES
If the matters publicized are ultimately proved at the trial, there is
likewise less chance of reversal.3 - At least one court held that it would
not reverse the denial of a continuance if a voluntary confession which
appeared in newspaper accounts was actually proven at the triaL3
Although the court did not expressly state its reasoning, it apparently -
applied the doctrine of harmless error, i.e., the introduction of the
confession gave the jurors present justification for their past preju-
dices, so that the trial court's refusal to grant the continuance, even
if erroneous, produced no harm. A similar position has been taken
where evidence showed that the jury could not have justifiably re-
turned a different verdict.39 However, newspaper publications of a
confession which is never introduced at the trial may strongly in-
influence an appellate court to find that a continuance should have
been granted."4
Several coarts have held that a continuance should have been
granted when newspaper publicity concerning the forthcoming trial
of one defendant was interwoven with the published accounts of the
preceding trial of a co-defendant. 1 The courts feel that publicity,
based upon sworn testimony, would prejudice jurors more than pub-
it had.... When... opposition is met, individuals will be diversely affected...
in accordance with other predetermining influences..
37. Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, Hunter v.
United States, 267 U.S. 597 (1925) where the court said: "So far as they told of
Monte's murder, nothing was related that was not proved upon the trial." Allen v.
United States, supra at 697. Commonwealth v. Spallone, 154 Pa. Super. 282, 35
A.2d 727 (1944). But see Owens v. State, 215 Ala. 42, 109 So. 109 (1926); State
v. Harris, 126 Kan. 710, 271 Pac. 316 (1928).
38. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 191 (1952).
39. State v. Gordon, 32 N.D. 31, 155 N.W. 59 (1915). Cf. State v. Loveless,
139 W. Va. 454, 80 S.E.2d 442 (1954).
40. See Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (where a false confession was
printed and never entered in evidence, the Court held that continuance should
have been granted); Note, Controlling Press and Radio Influence on Trials, 63
Harv. L. Rev. 840, 843 (1950), stating that: "[It would seem that newspaper
publications of evidence never introduced at the trial wbuld be more persuasive
than if the evidence had been introduced and subjected to cross-examination."
But see Owens v. State, 215 Ala. 42, 109 So. 109 (1926) (a different result in a
similar situation where a coerced confession was published and properly excluded
from evidence).
It should be noted that these cases are decided by appellate courts which glance
retrospectively at what transpired prior to and during the trial in the lower court.
The result of these decisions is to perplex a trial judge who does not have the
benefit of hindsight which appellate courts have, i.e., the trial judge does not
know whether to deny the motion for continuance because he does not have a
crystal ball to predict whether the prosecution will attempt to introduce the pub-
licized confession in evidence.
41. E.g., United States v. Dioguardi, 147 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). But
see Sims v. State, 177 Ga. 266, 170 S.E. 58 (1933).
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licity based upon speculation or an investigator's suspicion.2- Simi-
larly a continuance was granted where a defendant was convicted in
a preceding trial, and inflammatory publicity appeared prior to a
trial in which he was charged with a different crime.4" However,
where an accused was allowed a new trial and there had been sub-
stantial publicity concerning the first trial, one court stated that if
truthful publicity of a former trial can be seriously considered grounds
for continuance, no second trial would be possible in any case."
It has been held that the publicity must refer specifically to the
accused and the specific charge for'which he-is to be tried.'5 Thus,
where an accused was indicted under the Smith Act but publicity
concerned only an investigation of the tax difficulties of publishers of
a communist paper, postponement was denied; 4 1 nor was the publica-
tion of another's confession to ten or more similar offenses considered
-sufficient ground for continuance of accused's trial 7
If newspaper accounts are written in purely narrative fom' 8 and
are essentially objective,' 9 a continuance will not be favored because
the inflammatory elements will normally be missing.
3. Time Element
Whether or not the accused is under indictment when adverse news-
paper publicity appears is of prime importance, for this factor is
usually linked to the lapse of time between the appearance of pub-
licity and the trial.5 0 In the Delaney case, where the defendant was
under indictment when adverse publicity appeared, the court ex-
pressly refused to rule on what would have happened had defendant
not been under indictment, but recognized that if a legislative inves-
tigation resulted in the indictment, the time lag between publicity
and trial would be greater than in the case before it-1 Many cases
have refused to follow the Delaney decision when the defendant was
42. United States v. Dioguardi, supra note 41 at 422.
43. See note 25 supra.
44. State v. Hume, 146 Me. 129,-78 A.2d 496 (1951).
45. See, e.g, Robinson v. United States, 128 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1942); United
States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
46. United States v. Stein, supra note 45.
47. Robinson v. United States, 128 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1942). In this case the
court said: "A general indignation toward those who commit [a certain offense]
is not regarded by our society as bias or prejudice." Id. at 323.
48. Collins v. State, 234 Ala. 197, 174 So. 296 (1937) ; State v. Harris, 126 Kan.
710, 271 Pq.c. 316 (1928).
49. Kitts v. State, 153 Neb. 784, 46 N.W.2d 158 (1951).
50. See text supported by notes 55-59 infra.
51. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 115 (1st Cir. 1952). The court
also reasoned that committee investigations have their greatest utility before the
indictment of a person.
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not under indictment at the time of the damaging publicity and there
was a difference in time elapsed. -2 Thus, where a defendant was not
under indictment until six months after the publication of committee
reports, a motion for change of venue was denied.83
The time element also becomes important when determining
whether or not a continuance will be futile. Many courts have held
that denial of a continuance was justified when there were indications
that the accused would continue to be a "controversial, publicity-
invoking figure" and that the passage of time would result in little, if
any, abatement of hostile reports.,' Other factors which courts have
considered to determine whether a delay will afford the accused-
greater protection include the duration of publicity,s5 the national im-
portance of the accused, 6 and the nature of the crime.-7 It is sub-
mitted that courts should not be concerned with the state of public
excitement in the future, and that they should only consider whether
the accused can presently obtain a fair triaL5 8
In considering whether to grant a continuance, courts have thus
raised the following questions: Do jurors remember what they have
read? How many can remember the headlines in the morning paper?39
Modern psychologists have said that the effects of highly publicized
52. See note 53 infra, and text supported thereby.
53. United States v. Carper, 13 F.R.D. 483, 487 (D.C.D.C. 1953) (venue case).
In the Delaney case there were three months intervening between the first publica-
tion of the committee reports and the trial See also United States v. Hoffa, 156
F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.
N.Y. 1956).
54. E.g, United States v. Hoffa, supra note 53 at 500; State v. Orecchio, 27
N.J. Super. 484, 99 A.2d 595, af'd, 16 N.J. 125, 106 A.2d 541 (1953).
55. State v. Orecchio, supra note 54.
56. See, e.g, United States v. Hoifa, 156 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
57. Bryant v. State, 20 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955) where the court stated:
"In this case we have not found that the articles in the newspapers gave any
indication of intense public resentment such as there sometimes exists when a
woman or child is atrociously raped, or when there is a racial problem." Id. at
581, 115 A.2d at 509. The publicity in this case concerned a jail break. It is inter-
esting to note that this is the only case uncovered which expressly considers the
nature of the crime in regard to whether a continuance should be allowed because
of hostile publicity.
58. At first glance it would appear that adoption of this view would result in
indefinite postponement of the trial of an accused who is a public figure because
hostile publicity is likely to resume at the time he is finally tried. However, it is
felt that after "heads have had time to cool," the inflammatory effect of resumed
publicity will be diminished. In addition, although general publicity, hostile or
not, always accompanies a public figure, it appears that specific and detailed
references aimed at the particular offense he is charged with will diminish with
time. Thus, an accused will have a greater opportunity to obtain a fair trial.
59. Harvey, Trial By Newspaper, 42 Mass. L.Q. 8 (1957).
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information may linger in the sub-conscious long after the informa-
tion has been forgotten by the conscious, unknowingly affecting our
decisions.6o Most courts have not recognized such scientific data and
have generally felt that the defense over-estimates the duration of the
effects of hostile publicity; ,I that the startling headlines of today are
overshadowed by the startling headlines of tomorrow ;62 and that most
people only scan the headlines and soon forget matters which do not
directly concern them.23 It is probable that as the scientific data be-
comes more acceptable to and accepted by the courts, a motion for
continuance based upon hostile publicity will receive increasingly
more favorable consideration.
4. Instruction and Examination of the Jury
3fany times instructions to the jury to disregard any hostile pub-
licity have been deemed sufficient to ground a denial of a motion for
continuance which is based on charges of pre-existing bias against
the accused.64 Thus, a refusal to grant a continuance, requested be-
cause defamatory articles were published in two newspapers which
were held in contempt of court, was upheld because the trial judge
had warned the jurors not to read the newspapers or listen to the
radio55 One court has taken a stronger position, upholding a trial
court's denial of a continuance, because the judge warned the jury
60. Murphy and Newcomb, Experimental Social Psychology 962 (1937) which
states: "Opinion can be induced by means of judiciously selected selections in as
short a time as seven issues of a newspaper even when tlhe person, institution, or
question may be quite unknown .."
61- See United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952); United States
v. Connelly, 129 F. Supp. 786 (D. Minn. 1955) ; State v. Woods, 189 S.C. 281, 299,
1 S.E.2d 190, 198 (1939) (dissenting opinion) (stating that "zealous attorneys
often become imbued with the feeling that their clients are being unjustly
treated .... ").
62. United States v. Connelly, supra note 61, at 792. See also State v. Mar-
tinez, 220 La. 899, 57 So. 2d 888, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952).
63. United States v. Connelly, 129 F. Supp. 786, 791 (D. Minn. 1955).
64. E.g., Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941); Hart v.
United States, 112 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1940); Kitts v. State, 153 Neb. 784, 46
N.W-.2d 158 (1951) where the court reasoned that: "[T]he jurors were sworn,
and thereafter from adjournment to adjournment of the trial, the court contin-
uously, meticulously, and at great length, with unusual clarity and emphasis,
admonished the jury to keep an open and impartial mind, and not talk with each
other or with any other person about the case, and not to read anything published
in the newspapers . .. ." Id. at 795, 46 N.W.2d at 165. But see Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) where it is stated: "The naive assumption
that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to tjie jury... all practic-
ing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."
65. Shushan v. United States, supra note 64.
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not to read certain articles, referring to the page and date of the
allegedly prejudicial matter."6
It has been urged that if publicity is sufficiently inflammatory, the
court should presume the jurors to be prejudiced.67 This contention
may have some weight where there are no facts showing an absence
of prejudice, "" but in most instances the court is able to review the
voir dire examination. Regardless of the prejudicial nature and the
extent of. coverage of the publicity, the reviewing court will be hesi-
tant to interfere with the trial judge's denial of a continuance when
jurors were examined carefully on voir dire.69 Although there is no
uniform rule regarding what is deemed "careful," it is felt that courts
have not been very strict in their requirements."o Many courts have
considered the voir dire examination sufficient to show lack of preju-
dice where the jurors simply stated that regardless of their precon-
ceived opinions based on newspaper reports, they could render a fair
verdict.1 If there is no examination of the jurors by the defense,
most courts presume the jury is not prejudiced -.72 This presumption
was held to arise in one case where only a few of the jurors were
questioned.7 3 At the conclusion of voir dire, if the defense counsel
announces that he is satisfied with the jury,-' or if the jury is selected
from a special venire and the order for the venire was consented to
by the accused,-5 courts have regularly refused to upset the trial
court's denial of a continuance.
Special weight has been given to the fact that the defense did not
66. See Centoni v. United States, 69 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1934).
67. United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Penn. 1953).
68. Ibid. The court stated that in the Delaney case the court presumed preju-
dice because there was no evidence showing otherwise; here the questioning of the
jury showed lack of prejudice. Id. at 353.
69. E.g., United States v. Carper, 13 F.R.D. 483 (D.C.D.C. 1953) (venue
case); United States v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
70. See, e.g, Irvin v. Dowd, 153 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ind. 1957); People v.
Schneider, 309 Mich. 158, 14 N.W.2d 819 (1944).
71. Ibid. In the Dowd case the following answer by a juror was deemed suffi-
cient although he had admitted his preconceived opinions formed from newspaper
articles: "Q. Supposing that he, the defendant, were sitting up there in the jury
box instead of you and you were sitting down there as the defendant, would you
be willing for him to sit on your jury if you knew he had in his mind the same
thought, the same opinions, and the same attitudes toward you as you toward him?
A. Yes, I would." Id. at 537.
72. E.g., People v. Fitzsimmons, 320 Mich. 116, 30 N.W.2d 801 (1948); Common-
wealth v. Collins, 169 Pa. Super. 197, 82 A.2d 569 (1951).
73. United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952) (only 27 talesmen
questioned by both sides).
74. People v. Schneider, 309 Mich. 158, 14 N.V.2d 819 (1944).
75. Penny v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 192, 166 S.W.2d 18 (1942).
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take full advantage of its peremptory challenges.- Courts have rea-
soned that if the accused thought jurors were prejudiced, he should
have used all available means to secure an impartial jury, and if all
means are not used, he will be estopped from complaining." In one
case this proposition was given greater weight where it appeared
that some jurors who had not read the hostile newspaper publicity
were struck peremptorily, and others who had read it were accepted."9
The Delaney court apparently took a more realistic view of this
problem:
Nor do we think it significant that the defendant failed to
exhaust his peremptory challenges... Since he wis obliged to
stand trial in the hostile atmosphere engendered by extra court-
room publicity, he had little or no reason for assuming that onejuror rather than another would be more likely to be influenced,
consciously or unconsciously, by his preconceptions.. .1
Refusal of a trial judge to permit the defendant to ask jurors
whether they had read an article which was unrelated to the charge
against him was held to be insufficient grounds for reversal. 8 Most
courts hold that before jurors will be found to be prejudiced, they
must have read the specific material relating to the accused. 81 Even
if this specific material appears in headlines, one who reads headlines
only normally scans them without lasting perception of their full idea
and content. Therefore, courts are loath to grant continuances where
the accused shows only that jurors have read inflammatory head-
lines.82 Many of these courts are unwilling to allow the defense to test
jurors during voir dire by reading specific articles to them.83 Thus,
one case held that it was not error when a trial judge refused to per-
mit the accused's counsel to read an article to a juror after the juror
had testified that he did not remember reading the article." Similarly,
76. E.g., Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941); Allen v.
United States, 4 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, Hunter v. United States,
267 U.S. 597 (1925).
77. Ibid.
78. Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, Hunter v.
United States, 267 U.S. 597. (1925).
79. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 116 (1st Cir. 1952).
80. State v. Martinez, 220 La. 899, 57 So. 2d 888, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843
(1952).
81. E.g., ibid.; Commonwealth v. Spallone, 154 Pa. Super. 282, 35 A.2d 727
(1944).
82. United States v. Connelly, 129 F. Supp. 786 (D. Minn. 1955); State v.
Martinez, 220 ta. 899, 57 So. 2d 888, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952).
83. E.g., Biggers v. State, 171 Ga. 596, 156 S.E. 201 (1930) ; State v. Martinez,
supla note 82. 1
84. State v. 'Martinez, 220 La. 899, 57 So. 2d 888, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843
(1952).
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it was found proper to deny a request by counsel that he be allowed
the "privilege" of reading an article to the jury, and to inquire
whether it affected their minds in any way.s5 It is submitted that
these latter cases were correctly decided; it would be unreasonable to
subject jurors to a reading of prejudicial material which previously
may not have come to their attention.
5. Affldavits
It is 'Well established that a motion for continuance must be sup-
ported by an affidavit,66 and a trial court's refusal to allow oral testi-
mony instead of an affidavit has been upheld s7 Extreme care should
be exercised in preparing the affidavit in order to give the appellate
court an adequate basis for determining whether the trial court was
in error,sS particularly in criminal cases, for it has been held that the
great temptation to delay criminal proceedings requires that a motion
for continuance be scrutinized more carefully than in civil cases."'
An application for a continuance grounded on prejudice engendered
by publicity must contain many affidavits from diverse persons in the
community, alleging that this prejudice prevents the defendant from
receiving a fair trial at that time.90 A continuance was refused, how-
ever, when the defense, anticipating that prejudice would result from
a newspaper article, asked for time to investigate and secure the
necessary affidavits." And if the accused's attorney bases an affidavit
solely on his opinion, there is little chance that a court will upset the
trial judge's decision.92 This rule has been applied even when there
were strong grounds for the attorney's opinion, i.e., the failure of
many citizens to sign affidavits that the accused could not have a fair
trial, although they privately would admit that they thought he could
not; the court did indicate, however, that the affidavit might have
been sufficient if the names of these citizens had been supplied.93
It is essential that affidavits be supported by accompanying exhibits,
particularly when the motion for continuance is based on adverse
85. Biggers v. State, 171 Ga. 596, 156 S.E. 201 (1930).
86. E.g., State v. Taylor, 320 Mo. 417, 8 S.W.2d 29 (1928); Clark, Criminal
Procedure 483 (2d ed. 1918).
87. State v. Taylor, supra note 86.
88. Clark, op. cit. supra note 86. See United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623
(2d Cir. 1952).
89. Pittman v. State, 51 Fla. 94, 41 So. 385 (1906); Hysler v. State, 132 Fla.
209, 181 So. 354 (1938).
90. Moore v. State, 59 Fla. 23, 52 So. 971 (1910).
91. Sundahl v. State, 154 Neb. 550, 48 N.W.2d 689 (1951).
92. State v. Woods, 189 S.C. 281, 1 S.E.2d 190 (1939); State v. Rasor, 168 S.C.
221, 167 S.E. 396 (1933).
93. State v. Woods, supra note 92.
Washington University Open Scholarship
442 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
newspaper reports.9 4 For example, in Schino v. United States9 neither
the-newspaper reports nor committee reports appeared in the record,
even though they were the basis of apprehension. The court refused
to follow the Delaney decision, where affidavits for continuance were
supported by detailed exhibits showing hostile newspaper comments,
because in Schino it could not be determined whether the defendant
was justified in his concern over the publicity. It should be noted that
many courts which follow the above rule state that all presumptions
will be in favor of the lower court's ruling when the record is silent
or uncertain on any point.O The courts will not take judicial notice7
of allegedly prejudicial publicity, and it has been held error for a trial
judge to consider evidence acquired through his private investi-
gation.99
Counter-affidavits are always the proper method for the prosecu-
tion to controvert the accused's affidavits, 99 and are essential when the
defendant's affidavits and exhibits establish a prima facie case of
prejudice. When the prosecution's counter-affidavits directly contra-
dict those of the accused, the reviewing court will be reluctant to say
that the trial judge abused his discretion by denying a continuance 200
But the prosecution's affidavits stating that it is "thought" the ac-
cused can secure a fair trial have been held insufficient unless they in
addition affirmatively show either that public opinion is split or that
the accused is not the center of public discussion? 0'
6. Failure toL Ask for a Change of Venue
A change of venue has generally been considered adequate pro-
tection against hostile publicity,- resulting in the conclusion that
failure of an accused to request a change of venue in the trial court
will weigh heavily against reversal of the lower court's denial of a
94. See United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623, 625 (2d Cir. 1952) where the
court stated that "neither the committee's report nor the newspapers' comments
on it, are in the record, so that we cannot judge whether they supplied any basis
for counsel's apprehension." See also United States v. District Director of Immi-
gration & Naturalization, 222 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1955); Sehino v. United States,
209 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1953); Hoover v. State, 48 Neb. 184, 66 N.W. 1117 (1896).
95. Schino v. United States, supra note 94.
96. E.g., Robinson v. United States, 128 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Moore v.
State, 59 Fla. 23, 52 So. 971 (1910).
97. Schino v. United States, 209 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1953).
98. Caldwell v. State, 164 Tenn. 325, 48 S.W.2d 1087 (1932).
99. Adkins v. State, 42 Ariz. 534, 28 P.2d 612 (1934) ; State v. Taylor, 320 Mo.
417, 8 S.W.2d 29 (1928); Clark, Criminal Procedure 483 (2d ecL 1918).
100. Adkins v. State, supra note 99; State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac.
1071 (1915). Compare note 36 supra.
101. See Caldwell v. State, 164 Tenn. 325,48 S.W.2d 1087 (1932).
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continuance.102 However, the court in the Delaney case rejected this
reasoning:
Under the Sixth Amendment the accused enjoys the constitu-
tional right to a speedy and public trial, "by an impartial jury of
the State and district" wherein the alleged crimes are charged to
have been committed.... The right to apply for a change of
venue is given for the defendant's benefit and at his option. He
is not obliged to forego his constitutional right to an impartial
trial in. the district wherein the offense is alleged to have been
committed; and under the circumstances of this case we do not
think that the defendant's appeal stands any worse for failure
on his part to apply for a change of venue.203
It is submitted that the position taken by this court is more consistent
with the ultimate purpose of criminal procedure in this country-a
fair trial.
7. Failure of Other Defendants to Act
In a few cases it has been considered important that other defen-
dants who were tried for the same criminal act did not also move for
a continuance, 04 on the rationale that if other defendants thought
they could secure a fair trial then publicity must not have been hostile
enough to deprive the movant-defendant of a fair trial. 0 5 It is sub-
mitted that one defendant should not be prejudiced by the actions of
others, and that the court's only concern should be whether the
movant-defendant received a fair trial by an impartial jury.
CONCLUSION
At present an accused has little protection against hostile publicity.
Courts are hesitant to use their summary contempt power as a deter-
rent to LhiS publicity because of the potential conflict with the first
amendment right of a free press. 0 In addition, a secret trial without
the consent of the accused would violate due process. 0 7 Publicity is
102. E.g., Finnegan v. United States, 204 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1953); People v.
Fitzsimmons, 320 Mich. 116, 30 N.W.2d 801 (1948) ; State v. Loveless, 139 W. Va.
454, 80 S.E.2d 442 (1954).
103. 199 F.2d at 116. See also State v. Rasor, 168 S.C. 221, 227, 167 S.E. 396,
399 (1933) where it was shown that the first trial did not come up for four
months and defendant had no reason to ask for a change of venue because he had
no reason to expect that he would not get a fair trial, and thus he was not pre-
cluded from then asking for a continuance at a later trial.
104. Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, Hunter v.
United States, 267 U.S. 597 (1925); United States v. District Director of Immi-
gration & Naturalization, 222 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1955).
105. See note 104 supra.
106. See note 8 supra.
107. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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often widespread so that a change of venue will afford little protec-
tion. Courts have not been liberal in granting continuances, probably
because this creates grave administrative problems. A more generous
allowance of continuances, although accompanied by some difficulty,
appears to be the most effective means of relief without encroaching
on constitutional rights.
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